Strong Pseudoprimes to Twelve Prime Bases by Sorenson, Jonathan P. & Webster, Jonathan
STRONG PSEUDOPRIMES TO TWELVE PRIME BASES
JONATHAN SORENSON AND JONATHAN WEBSTER
Abstract. Let ψm be the smallest strong pseudoprime to the first m prime
bases. This value is known for 1 ≤ m ≤ 11. We extend this by finding ψ12
and ψ13. We also present an algorithm to find all integers n ≤ B that are
strong pseudoprimes to the first m prime bases; with a reasonable heuristic
assumption we can show that it takes at most B2/3+o(1) time.
1. Introduction
Fermat’s Little Theorem states that if n is prime and gcd(a, n) = 1, then
an−1 ≡ 1 (mod n).
A composite number for which this congruence holds is called a pseudoprime to
the base a. We can restate Fermat’s Little Theorem by algebraically factoring
(repeatedly) the difference of squares that arises in an−1 − 1. In which case, if n is
an odd prime, writing n− 1 = 2sd with d odd, and gcd(a, n) = 1, then either
ad ≡ 1 (mod n)
or
a2
kd ≡ −1 (mod n)
for some integer k with 0 ≤ k < s. If a composite n satisfies the above, we call
n a strong pseudoprime to the base a. Unlike Carmichael numbers, which are
pseudoprimes to all bases, there do not exist composite numbers that are strong
pseudoprimes to all bases. This fact forms the basis of the Miller-Rabin probabilistic
primality test [13]. Define ψm to be the smallest integer that is a strong pseudoprime
to the first m prime bases. (See A014233 at oeis.org.)
The problem of finding strong pseudoprimes has a long history. Pomerance, Sel-
fridge, and Wagstaff [12] computed ψm for m = 2, 3, and 4. Jaeschke [7] computed
ψm for m = 5, 6, 7, and 8. By looking at a narrow class of numbers, Zhang [18] gave
upper bounds on ψm for 9 ≤ m ≤ 19. Recently, Jian and Deng [8] verified some of
Zhang’s conjectures and computed ψm for m = 9, 10, and 11. We continue in this
effort with the following.
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Theorem 1.1.
ψ12 = 3186 65857 83403 11511 67461.
ψ13 = 33170 44064 67988 73859 61981.
We also verified Jian and Deng’s work in finding ψ9 = ψ10 = ψ11. Note that the
ERH implies ψm ≥ exp(
√
m/2), if ψm exists [1].
The proof of our theorem relies primarily on running an improved algorithm for
finding strong pseudoprimes:
Theorem 1.2. Given a bound B > 0 and an integer m > 0 that grows with B,
there is an algorithm to find all integers ≤ B that are products of exactly two primes
and are strong pseudoprimes to the first m prime bases using at most B2/3+o(1)
arithmetic operations.
We have a heuristic argument extending this B2/3+o(1) running time bound to
integers with an arbitrary number of prime divisors. This result is an improvement
over a heuristic O(B9/11) from [2]. Our algorithm uses the work of Jian and Deng
as a starting point, and our specific improvements are these:
• We applied the results in Bleichenbacher’s thesis [2] to speed the computa-
tion of GCDs. See §2.2.
• We applied the space-saving sieve [4, 15] which enabled us to sieve using
full prime signature information. See §2.3.
• We used a simple table of linked-lists indexed by a hash function based on
prime signatures. We used this to store small primes by signature for very
fast lookup. See §2.4.
• When it made sense to do so, we parallelized our code and made use of Big
Dawg, Butler University’s cluster supercomputer.
Our changes imply that adding more prime bases for a pseudoprime search (that
is, making m larger) speeds up the algorithm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a description
of the algorithm and its theoretical underpinnings. Section 3 contains the proof of
the running time. Section 4 contains implementation details.
2. Algorithmic Theory and Overview
To find all n ≤ B that are strong pseudoprimes to the first m prime bases, we use
some well-known conditions to limit how many such integers n we need to check.
This is outlined in the first subsection below.
We construct all possibilities by generating n in factored form, n = p1p2 . . . pt−1pt,
where t is the number of prime divisors of n, and pi < pi+1. It turns out that t
cannot be too big; we only had to test up to t = 6. So we wrote separate programs
for each possible t and the case t = 2 dominates the running time.
Let k = p1p2 · · · pt−1. Our algorithms generate all candidate k values, and
then for each k search for possible primes pt to match with k, to form a strong
pseudoprime candidate n = kpt.
For the bound B, we choose a cutoff value X. For k ≤ X, we use a GCD
computation to search for possible primes pt, if they exist. For k > X, we use
sieving to find possible primes pt. Again, we use separate programs for GCDs and
for sieving.
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Once each n is formed, we perform a strong pseudoprime test for the first m
prime bases to see if we have, in fact, found what we are looking for.
2.1. Conditions on (Strong) Pseudoprimes. For the purposes of this paper,
it suffices to check square-free odd integers. A computation by Dorais and Klyve
[3] shows that a pseudoprime to the bases 2 and 3 must be square-free if it is less
than 4.4 · 1031. Since the values Zhang conjectured as candidates for ψ12 and ψ13
are less than 4.4 · 1031, we restrict our search to square-free numbers.
In general, to rule out integers divisible by squares, it suffices to find all Wieferich
primes ≤ B1/2, and for each such prime, perform appropriate tests. This can easily
be done in well under O(B2/3) time. See §3.6.1 in [2].
To each prime p we associate a vector called its signature. Let ν = (a1, a2, . . . , am)
for ai distinct positive integers. Then the signature of p is
σνp = (v(ordp(a1)), v(ordp(a2)), . . . , v(ordp(am))) ,
where v denotes valuation with respect to 2 and ordp(a) is the multiplicative order
of a modulo p.
Example 2.1. Let p be the prime 151121. Then σνp = (3, 4, 0, 4, 2, 1, 2, 4) if ν =
(2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19).
Theorem 2.2 (Proposition 1 in [7]). Let n = p1 · · · pt with t distinct primes,
ν = (a1, a2, . . . , am) with different integers such that pi - aj for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t and
1 ≤ j ≤ m. Then n is a strong pseudoprime to each base in ν if and only if n is a
pseudoprime to each base in ν and σνp1 = · · · = σνpt .
If t > 2, then this theorem greatly limits the number of candidate k values we
need to check. In the case t = 2 the initial sub-product k is just a single prime,
so this theorem does not, at first, appear to help. However, it does play a role in
sieving for pt. For the rest of this paper, we use ν as the vector containing the first
m = 11 or 12 prime numbers.
2.2. Greatest Common Divisors. As above, let k = p1 · · · pt−1. We explain in
this subsection how to find all possible choices for pt to form n = kpt as a strong
pseudoprime to the first m prime bases using a simple GCD computation.
Let b be one of the ai from ν. The pseudoprimality condition b
kpt−1 ≡ 1
(mod kpt) implies that
bkpt−1 ≡ bk(pt−1)+k−1 ≡ bk−1 ≡ 1 (mod pt),
i.e., that pt divides b
k−1 − 1. Considering multiple bases, we know that pt must
divide
gcd
(
ak−11 − 1, ak−12 − 1, . . . , ak−1m − 1
)
.
However, since we are concerned with strong pseudoprimes, we can consider only
the relevant algebraic factor of bk−1 − 1. Following Bleichenbacher’s notation [2],
let k − 1 = u2d for u odd and
h(b, k) =
{
bu − 1 if v(ordk(b)) = 0
bu2
c−1
+ 1 if v(ordk(b)) = c > 0
.
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Theorem 2.3 (Theorem 3.23 of [2]). A necessary condition for an integer n of the
from n = kpt, for a given k with pt prime, to be a strong pseudprime to the bases
a1, . . . , am is that pt divide gcd(h(a1, k), . . . , h(am, k)).
This theorem allows us to construct the product of all possible pt values for a
given k by computing a GCD. To carry this out, we figure out which of the h(ai, k)
values would be the smallest, compute that, and then compute the next smallest
h value modulo the smallest, perform a GCD, and repeat until we get an answer
≤ k, or use up all the ai base values.
Example 2.4. Let k = 151121, which is prime. We have
v(ordk(2)) = 3 =⇒ 237780 + 1 ≈ 8.189× 1011372,
v(ordk(3)) = 4 =⇒ 375560 + 1 ≈ 1.914× 1036051,
v(ordk(5)) = 0 =⇒ 59445 − 1 ≈ 5.911× 106601.
In this case, we would begin the computations with 59445−1 since it is the smallest.
We then compute gcd(237780 + 1 mod (59445 − 1), 59445 − 1) = 151121. This tells
us that any n of the form 151121 · pt is not a strong pseudoprime to the vector
ν = (2, 3, 5).
These computations start off easy as k is small and progressively get harder (in
an essentially linear fashion) as k grows. As a practical matter, these computations
only need to be done once. As an example, [8] found
84 98355 74122 37221 = 206135341 · 412270681
to be a strong pseudoprime to the first eight prime bases. When considering p1 =
206135341, they sieved (which we explain in the next section) for p2 = 412270681.
It is reasonable to ask whether there is a larger prime that can be paired with p1
that would form a strong pseudoprime to eight bases. In our computation we check
by computing a GCD to answer “no.”
Algorithm 1: Using GCDs to rule out k values
Input: Integers t and k, where t is the number of prime divisors and k is the prod-
uct of t− 1 primes with matching signature, and the base vector ν containing
the m smallest primes.
1: Let b ∈ ν give the smallest estimated value for h(b, k) as defined above.
2: If b = a1, let i = 2 else let i = 1.
3: Compute h(b, k).
4: Compute x = h(ai, k) mod h(b, k) using modular exponentiation.
5: Set x = gcd(h(b, k), x);
6: while x > k and i < m do
7: Set i = i+ 1; if ai = b set i = i+ 1 again.
8: Compute y = h(ai, k) mod x.
9: Set x = gcd(x, y).
10: end while
11: if x < k then
12: We can rule out k.
13: else
14: We factor x and check each prime pt | x with pt > k to see if kpt is a strong
pseudoprime.
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15: end if
Computing h(b, k) is the bottleneck of this algorithm. When using m = 11 or
higher, we never found anything to factor in the last step.
2.3. Sieving. As above, let k = p1 · · · pt−1 and we try to construct n = kpt by
finding pt. In order to search up to a bound B, we need to search primes pt in
the interval [pt−1, B/k]. We combine two types of sieving to search this interval
quickly. The first we call λ-sieving, and the second we call signature sieving. For
each prime p define
λp = lcm {ordp(a) : a ∈ ν} .
By the r-rank Artin Conjecture [11], we expect with very high probability that
λp = p− 1. Let λ = lcm
{
λp1 , . . . , λpt−1
}
. Since akpt−1 ≡ 1 (mod n) for any a ∈ ν
this means kpt − 1 is a multiple of λ. So, pt ≡ k−1 (mod λ). This tells us that
pt lies in a specific residue class modulo λ, and we call searching for pt using this
value λ-sieving.
We can further narrow down the residue classes that pt may lie in with respect
to primes in ν. The following two propositions appeared originally in [7].
Proposition 2.5. For primes p and q, if v(p − 1) = v(q − 1) and v(ordp(a)) =
v(ordq(a)) then
(
a
p
)
=
(
a
q
)
.
Proposition 2.6. For primes p and q, if v(p − 1) < v(q − 1) and v(ordp(a)) =
v(ordq(a)) then
(
a
q
)
= 1.
One may consider higher reciprocity laws, and Jaeschke did so [7]. We found
quadratic reciprocity sufficient.
The authors of [8] consider searching for pt modulo lcm{λ, 9240}. They consid-
ered 30 residue classes modulo 9240 = 8 ·3 ·5 ·7 ·11 that arose from the propositions
above. With the inclusion of each additional prime from ν, we effectively rule out
half of the cases to consider, thereby doubling the speed of the sieving process.
Ideally, we would like to include every prime in ν for the best performance, but
with normal sieving, the sieve modulus becomes quite large and requires we keep
track of too many residue classes to be practical. Instead, we adapted the space-
saving wheel datastructure [16, 15], which had been used successfully to sieve for
pseudosquares. Sieving for primes pt with specified quadratic character modulo a
list of small primes is the same algorithmic problem. This wheel sieve uses a data
structure that takes space proportional to
∑
a∈ν a instead of space proportional to∏
a∈ν a as used in traditional sieving. It does, however, produce candidate primes
pt out of order. This is not an issue, so long as we make sure the sieve modulus
does not exceed B. In practice, we dynamically include primes from ν so that
1000 · k · lcm{λ, 8, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31} < ψ13, and we favor the inclusion
of smaller primes.
Algorithm 2: Sieving
Input: k in factored form as k = p1p2 · · · pt−1, λpi for i < t, search bound B, and
base vector ν of length m.
1: Compute λk = lcm{λpi}.
2: Set w = 1. Compute wheel modulus w as follows:
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3: for i = 2, . . . ,m do
4: if kλkaiw < B/1000 then
5: if ai does not divide λk then
6: Set w = w · ai.
7: end if
8: end if
9: end for
10: if λk divisible by 4 then
11: Set λ = λk
12: else
13: Set λ = λk/2 and
14: Set w = 8w
15: end if
16: Let σ be the signature of p1.
17: Build a wheel with modulus w so that for each prime power q | w we have primes
p generated by the wheel with (p/q) consistent with σ as in Propositions 2.5
and 2.6.
18: for each residue r modulo w generated by the wheel do
19: Use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to compute x mod wλ such that x ≡
r mod w and x ≡ k−1 mod λ.
20: Sieve for primes in the interval [k + 1, B/k] that are ≡ x mod wλ.
21: For each such probable prime pt found, perform a strong pseudoprime test
on kpt.
22: end for
Note that if k consists entirely of primes that are ≡ 3 mod 4, then all primes pt
found by the sieve, when using all of ν, will have the correct signature.
Example 2.7. Consider p = 3 · 108 + 317. Now, λ = p− 1 = 22 · 7 · 11 · 23 · 42349
(factorization is obtained via sieving). We may use signature information for the
primes 3, 5, 13, 17, 19, 29, 31, and 37. However, since B = 4 · 1024 we may only
use the first 4 primes in the signature before the combined modulus is too large.
The signature information for 3 implies that q ≡ 5, 7 (mod 12) however, the case
q ≡ 7 (mod 12) need not be considered since we know (because of λ) that q ≡ 1
(mod 4). Given the signature information for the primes 5 and 13, we search in
{2, 3 (mod 5)} and {2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11 (mod 13)}. At this point we sieve for primes
q ≡ 1 (mod λ). To this we add the following 12 new congruence conditions and
sieve for each individual condition.
(1) Let q ≡ 2 (mod 5).
(a) Let q ≡ 2 (mod 13).
(b) Let q ≡ 5 (mod 13).
(c) Let q ≡ 6 (mod 13).
(d) Let q ≡ 7 (mod 13).
(e) Let q ≡ 8 (mod 13).
(f) Let q ≡ 11 (mod 13).
(2) Let q ≡ 3 (mod 5).
(a) Let q ≡ 2 (mod 13).
(b) Let q ≡ 5 (mod 13).
(c) Let q ≡ 6 (mod 13).
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(d) Let q ≡ 7 (mod 13).
(e) Let q ≡ 8 (mod 13).
(f) Let q ≡ 11 (mod 13).
2.4. Hash Table Datastructure. In order to compute GCDs or sieve as described
above, it is necessary to construct integers k = p1p2 · · · pt−1 in an efficient way,
where all the primes pi have matching signatures. We do this by storing all small
primes in a hash table datastructure that supports the following operations:
• Insert the prime p with its signature σp. We assume any prime being
inserted is larger than all primes already stored in the datastructure. (That
is, insertions are monotone increasing.) We also store λp with p and its
signature for use later, thereby avoiding the need to factor p− 1.
• Fetch a list of all primes from the datastructure, in the form of a sorted
array s[ ], whose signatures match σ. The fetch operation brings the λp
values along as well.
We then use this algorithm to generate all candidate k values for a given t and
ν:
Algorithm 3: Generating k Values
Input: t > 2, search bound B, cutoff X < B, base vector ν of length m.
1: Let T denote our hash table datastructure
2: Let am+1 denote the smallest prime not in ν.
3: for each prime p ≤
√
B/at−2m+1 (with p− 1 in factored form) do
4: Compute λp from the factorization of p− 1;
5: s[ ] := T .fetch(σp); List of primes with matching signature
6: for 0 ≤ i1 < · · · < it−2 ≤ s.length do
7: Form k = s[i1] · · · s[it−2] · p;
8: if k ≤ X then
9: Use k in a GCD computation to find matching pt values;
10: else
11: Use k for a sieving computation to find matching pt values;
12: end if
13: end for
14: if p ≤ (B/at−3m+1)1/3 then
15: T .insert(p,σp,λp);
16: end if
17: end for
Note that the inner for-loop above is coded using t−2 nested for-loops in practice.
This is partly why we wrote separate programs for each value of t. To make this
work as a single program that handles multiple t values, one could use recursion on
t.
Also note that we split off the GCD and sieving computations into separate
programs, so that the inner for-loop was coded to make sure we always had either
k ≤ X or X < k < B/p as appropriate.
We implemented this datastructure as an array or table of 2m linked lists, and
used a hash function on the prime signature to compute which linked list to use.
The hash function h : σ → 0..(2m − 1) computes its hash value from the signature
as follows:
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• If σ = (0, 0, 0, . . . , 0), the all-zero vector, then h(σ) = 0, and we are done.
• Otherwise, compute a modified copy of the signature, σ′. If σ contains only
0s and 1s, then σ′ = σ. If not, find the largest integer entry in σ, and
entries in σ′ are 1 if the corresponding entry in σ matches the maximum,
and 0 otherwise.
For example, if σ = (3, 4, 0, 4, 2, 1, 2, 4) (our example from earlier), then
σ′ = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1).
• h(σ) is the value of σ′ viewed as an integer in binary.
So for our example, h((3, 4, 0, 4, 2, 1, 2, 4)) = 010100012 = 64 + 16 + 1 =
81.
Computing a hash value takes O(m) time.
Each linked list is maintained in sorted order; since the insertions are monotone,
we can simply append insertions to the end of the list, and so insertion time is
dominated by the time to compute the hash value, O(m) time. Note that the
signature and λp is stored with the prime for use by the fetch operation.
The fetch operation computes the hash value, and then scans the linked list,
extracting primes (in order) with matching signature. If the signature to match is
binary (which occurs roughly half the time), we expect about half of the primes
in the list to match, so constructing the resulting array s[ ] takes time linear in
m multiplied by the number of primes fetched. Note that λ values are brought
along as well. Amortized over the full computation, fetch will average time that is
linear in the size of the data returned. Also note that the average cost to compare
signatures that don’t match is constant.
The total space used by the data structure is an array of length 2m, plus one
linked list node for each prime ≤ B1/3. Each linked list node holds the prime, its λ
value, and its signature, for a total of O(2m logB +mB1/3) bits, since each prime
is O(logB) bits.
2.5. Algorithm Outline. Now that all the pieces are in place, we can describe
the algorithm as a whole.
Given an input bound B, we compute the GCD/sieve cutoff X (this is discussed
in §3 below).
We then compute GCDs as discussed above using candidate k values ≤ X for
t = 2, 3, . . .. For some value of t, we’ll discover that there are no candidate k values
with t− 1 prime factors, at which point we are done with GCD computations.
Next we sieve as discussed above, using candidate k values > X for t = 2, 3, . . ..
Again, for some t value, we’ll discover there are no candidate k values with t − 1
prime factors, at which point we are done.
We wrote a total of eight programs; GCD programs for t = 2, 3, 4 and sieving
programs for t = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Also, we did not bother to use the wheel and signature
sieving, relying only on λ sieving, for t > 3.
3. Algorithm Analysis
3.1. Model of Computation. We assume a RAM model, with potentially infinite
memory. Arithmetic operations on integers of O(logB) bits (single-precision) and
basic array indexing and control operations all are unit cost. We assume fast, FFT-
based algorithms for multiplication and division of large integers. For n-bit inputs,
multiplication and division cost M(n) = O(n log n log log n) operations [14]. From
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this, an FFT-based GCD algorithm takes O(M(n) log n) = O(n(log n)2 log log n)
operations; see, for example, [17].
3.2. Helpful Number Theory Results. Let our modulus q =
∏
ai∈ν ai so that
φ(q) =
∏
ai∈ν φ(ai); each base ai is an odd prime with φ(ai) = a1 − 1, except for
a1 = 8 with φ(a1) = 4. We use our two propositions from §2.3, together with
quadratic reciprocity to obtain a list of (ai − 1)/2 residue classes for each odd
prime ai and two residue classes modulo 8. The total number of residue classes is
2−mφ(q). A prime we are searching for with a matching signature must lie in one
of these residue classes.
Let us clarify that when we state in sums and elsewhere that a prime p has
signature equivalent to σ, we mean that the quadratic character (p/ai) is consistent
with σ as stated in Propositions 2.5 and 2.6. We write σ ≡ σp to denote this
consistency under quadratic character, which is weaker than σ = σp.
Lemma 3.1. Given a signature σ of length m, and let q =
∏
i ai as above. Let
 > 0. If q < x1−, then number of primes p ≤ x with σp ≡ σ is at most
O
(
x
2m log x
)
.
Proof. This follows almost immediately from the Brun-Titchmarsh Theorem. See,
for example, Iwaniec [6]. We simply sum over the relevant residue classes mod q
based on quadratic character using Propositions 2.5 and 2.6. 
We will choose m proportional to logB/ log logB so that q = Bc for some
constant 0 < c < 1.
Lemma 3.2. We have ∑
p≤x,σp≡σ
1
p
= O(2−m log log x).
This follows easily from Lemma 3.1 by partial summation. We could make this
tighter by making use of Theorem 4 from [9], and observe that the constants C(q, a)
(in their notation) cancel with one another in a nice fashion when summing over
different residue classes modulo q. See also section 6 of that paper.
Let pit,σ(x) denote the number of integers ≤ x with exactly t distinct prime
divisors, each of which has signature equivalent to σ of length m.
Lemma 3.3.
pit,σ(x) x(log log x)
t−1
2tm log x
.
Proof. Proof is by induction on t. t = 1 follows from Lemma 3.1.
For the general case, we sum over the largest prime divisor p of n,
pit,σ(x) =
∑
p≤x,σp=σ
pit−1,σ(x/p)

∑
p≤x,σp≡σ
x(log log(x/p))t−2
p2(t−1)m log(x/p)
 x(log log x)
t−1
2tm log x
.
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We used Lemma 3.2 for the last step. (See also the proof of Theorem 437 in [5,
§22.18].) 
Let λp,m denote the value of λp for the prime p using a vector ν with the first
m prime bases. We need the following lemma from [10, Cor. 2.4]:
Lemma 3.4. There exists a constant τ > 0 such that∑
p≤x
1
λp,m
 x
1/(m+1)
(log x)1+τ/(m+1)
.
Using this, we obtain the following.
Theorem 3.5. Let 0 < θ < 1. Then∑
xθ<p≤x
1
pλp,m
 1
xθ−1/(m+1) log x
.
Proof. We have ∑
xθ<p≤x
1
pλp,m
≤ 1
xθ
∑
xθ<p≤x
1
λp,m
 1
xθ
x1/(m+1)
(log x)1+τ/(m+1)
.
Note that τ > 0. 
3.3. A Conjecture. In order to prove our B2/3+o(1) running time bound for t > 2,
we make use of the conjecture below. Let K = K(t, σ) be the set of integers with
exactly t distinct prime divisors each of which has signature matching σ. In other
words, pit,σ(x) counts integers in K bounded by x.
Conjecture 3.6. Let B, σ, t,m, ν be as above. Then∑
k≤x,k∈K(t,σ)
1
λk,m
 xo(1).
Theorem 3.7. Assuming Conjecture 3.6 is true, we have∑
xθ≤k≤x,k∈K(t,σ)
1
kλk,m
 x−θ+o(1).
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as that of Theorem 3.5. Simply substitute
Conjecture 3.6 for Lemma 3.4. 
3.4. Proof of Theorem 1.2. We now have the pieces we need to prove our running
time bound.
As above, each pseudoprime candidate we construct will have the form n = kpt,
where k is the product of t − 1 distinct primes with matching signature. Again,
ν = (2, 3, 5, . . .) is our base vector of small primes of length m.
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3.4.1. t = 2. In this case k is prime.
GCD Computation. For each prime k = p ≤ X we perform a GCD computa-
tion as described in §2.2. The bottleneck of this computation is computing GCDs
of O(p)-bit integers. This gives a running time proportional to∑
p≤X
M(p) log p  pi(X)X(logX)2 log logX
 X2 logX log logX.
Sieving Computation. For each prime k = p with X < p < B/p, we sieve
the interval [p+ 1, B/p] for primes that are ≡ 1 mod λp. We also employ signature
sieving, but for the simplicity of analysis, we omit that for now. Using the methods
from [15], we can sieve an arithmetic progression of length ` inO(` logB) operations.
We do not need proof of primality here, so a fast probabilistic test works fine. This
gives a running time proportional to∑
X<p≤B/p
B logB
pλp
 B logB
∑
X<p≤B/X
1
pλp
.
At this point we know X2 ≤ B and, to keep the GCD and sieving computations
balanced, X ≥ B1/4, say. This means Theorem 3.5 applies; we set xθ = X and
x = B/X to obtain
B logB
∑
X<p≤B/X
1
pλp
 B logB (B/X)
1/(m+1)
X log(B/X)
 B
X
(B/X)1/(m+1)
= (B/X)1+o(1)
assuming that m→∞ with B.
Minimizing X2+o(1) + (B/X)1+o(1) implies X = B1/3 and gives the desired
running time of B2/3+o(1). This completes our proof. .
3.4.2. t > 2. In this case k is composite.
GCD Computation. For t > 2 we construct integers k = rp for computing
GCDs, with r consisting of exactly t− 2 prime divisors less than p, with signatures
matching σp. For each prime p, we perform a hash table lookup and fetch the list of
such primes; this is Step 5 of Algorithm 3. This overhead cost is O(m)+O(piσp(p)) =
O(m+ 2−mp/ log p). Summing this over all primes p ≤ X gives O(2−mX2/ logX).
Next, for each prime p ≤ X we construct at most pit−2,σp(X/p) values for r (Step
7 of Algorithm 3), and using Lemma 3.3 and multiplying by the cost of computing
the GCD, this gives us
(3.1)
∑
p≤X
pit−2,σp(X/p) ·M(X) logX  X2
(
log logX
2m
)t−2
logX
for the total running time.
Sieving Computation. Again, the main loop enumerates all choices for the
second-largest prime p = pt−1. First, we construct all possible k-values with k > X,
k < B/p, and p | k, so k/p = r = p1 · · · pt−2 with all the pi < pi+1 and pt−2 < p.
We also have pt−2 < B1/3. This implies p > X1/(t−1).
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For a given p, fetching the list of primes below u := min{p,B/p2} with matching
signatures takes O(m+u/(2m log u)) time (Algorithm 3 Step 5). Summing over all
p ≤ √B, splitting the sum at p = B1/3, this takes 2−mB2/3+o(1) time.
As above, we write r = k/p. We claim that the total number of k values is
2−m(t−2)B2/3+o(1). Let u be as above. There are at most pit−2,σp(u) values of r for
each p. Again, splitting this at B1/3, we have∑
X1/(t−1)<p≤B1/3
pit−2,σp(p) 
∑
X1/(t−1)<p≤B1/3
p(log log p)t−3
2(t−2)m log p
 2−m(t−2)B2/3+o(1).
and ∑
B1/3<p≤√B
pit−2,σp(B/p
2) 
∑
B1/3<p≤√B
B(log logB)t−3
p22(t−2)m logB
 1
B1/3 logB
B(log logB)t−3
2(t−2)m logB
 2−m(t−2)B2/3+o(1).
This covers work done at Step 7 of Algorithm 3.
Finally, the cost of sieving is at most∑
X1/(t−1)<p≤√B
∑
r
B logB
rpλrp
.
If we use Theorem 3.7, based on our conjecture, and using the lower bound X ≤
k = rp, this leads to the bound
(3.2)
(
log logB
2m
)t−2
B1+1/(m+1)+o(1)
X
.
Without the conjecture, we use Lemma 3.2 together with the argument outlined in
Hardy and Wright [5] in deriving (22.18.8), we obtain that∑
r
1
r
∼
(
log logB
2m
)t−2
.
We then use
1
λrp
≤ 1
λp
.
As above, this leads to the bound
(3.3)
(
log logB
2m
)t−2
B1+1/(m+1)
X1/(t−1)
.
To balance the cost of GCDs with sieving, we want to balance (3.1) with (3.2) or
(3.3), depending on whether we wish to assume our conjecture or not. Simplifying
a bit, this means balancing X2+o(1) with either (B/X)1+o(1) or B1+o(1)/X1/(t−1).
The optimal cutoff point is then either X = B1/3 under the assumption of Conjec-
ture 3.6, or X = B(t−1)/(2t−1) unconditionally, for a total time of(
log logB
2m
)t−2
B2/3+o(1)
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with our conjecture, or (
log logB
2m
)t−2
B1−
1
2t−1+o(1)
without. We have proven the following.
Theorem 3.8. Assuming Conjecture 3.6, our algorithm takes B2/3+o(1) time to
find all integers n ≤ B that are strong pseudoprimes to the first m prime bases, if
m→∞ with B.
If we choose m so that q is a fractional power of B, then Lemma 3.3 implies
that there is a constant c > 0 such that if t > c log logB, then there is no work
to do. This explains why our computation did not need to go past t = 6. It also
explains why, in practice, the t = 2 case is the bottleneck of the computation, and
is consistent with the implications of our conjecture that the work for each value
of t decreases as t increases.
4. Implementation Details
In this final section, we conclude with some details from our algorithm imple-
mentation.
4.1. Strong Pseudoprimes Found. In addition to our main results for ψ12 and
ψ13, we discovered the following strong pseudoprimes. This first table contains
pseudoprimes found while searching for ψ12
n Factorization
3825123056546413051 747451· 149491 ·34233211
230245660726188031 787711· 214831· 1360591
360681321802296925566181 424665351661·849330703321
164280218643672633986221 286600958341·573201916681
318665857834031151167461 399165290221·798330580441
7395010240794120709381 60807114061·121614228121
164280218643672633986221 286600958341·573201916681
This second table contains pseudoprimes found while verifying ψ13.
n Factorization
318665857834031151167461 399165290221·798330580441
2995741773170734841812261 1223875355821·2447750711641
667636712015520329618581 577770158461·1155540316921
3317044064679887385961981 1287836182261·2575672364521
3317044064679887385961981 1247050339261·2494100678521
552727880697763694556181 525703281661·1051406563321
360681321802296925566181 424665351661·849330703321
7395010240794120709381 60807114061·121614228121
3404730287403079539471001 1304747157001·2609494314001
164280218643672633986221 286600958341·573201916681
4.2. Hash Table Datastructure. It is natural to wonder how much time is
needed to manage the hash table datastructure from §2.4. Specifically, we mea-
sured the time to create the table when inserting all primes up to a set bound.
For this measurement, we used a vector ν with the first 8 prime bases. We also
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Figure 1. GCD timings
measured how long it took, for each prime up to the bound listed, to also perform
the fetch operation, which returns a list of primes with matching signature with λ
values.
Largest Prime Table Entries Creation Time Fetching Time
106 78490 1.13 2.58
107 664571 11.49 2:44.49
108 5761447 1:56.22 3:30:50.2
The times are given in seconds, or minutes:seconds, or hours:minutes:seconds as
appropriate.
We felt the data structure was a success, in that it was fast and small enough
that it was not noticed in the larger computation.
4.3. Almost-Linear GCDs. In Figure 1, we present the times to perform Algo-
rithm 1 on selected prime values for k (so this is for the t = 2 case). The data
points were obtained by averaging the time needed to carry out Algorithm 1 for the
first ten primes exceeding n · 107 for 1 ≤ n ≤ 35. Averaging was required because
the size of the h values is not uniformly increasing in k. This explains the variance
in the data; for example, the first ten primes after 35 ·107 happened to have smaller
h values on average than the first ten primes after 34 · 107.
It should be clear from the data that our GMP algorithm for computing GCDs
was using an essentially linear-time algorithm. Note that if we chose to extend the
computation to large enough k values, memory would become a concern and we
would expect to see paging/thrashing degrade performance.
4.4. GCD/Sieving Crossover. In Figure 2, we present a comparison of the tim-
ings for computing GCDs (Algorithm 1, diamonds on the graph) with signature
sieving (Algorithm 2, squares on the graph). For this graph, we are looking at
choosing the crossover point X, and again, we are focusing on the t = 2 case.
• One would expect that the signature sieving curve should behave as an
inverse quadratic; the time to sieve for one prime k = p is proportional to
B logB
pλp
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Figure 2. Signature Sieving and GCD timing
and we expect λp ≈ p − 1 most of the time. However, utilizing signatures
obscures this to some degree, since the algorithm cannot make use of all
prime bases if they divide λ, hence the minor variations in the curve. Let
us elaborate this here.
The data points for signature sieving in Figure 2 represent the average
sieve time for the first 50 primes past n · 107 for 10 ≤ n ≤ 60. There is
a lot of variance in these timing because of the inclusion and exclusion of
primes from the signature depending if they are relatively prime to λ. For
example, p = 174594421 has λ = 22 · 33 · 5 · 11 · 13 · 17 · 19 and therefore has
few primes from the base set to use in signature sieving. The inability to
add extra primes shows up in the timing data; a careful inspection of the
data shows a strange jump when primes transition from 28 · 107 to 29 · 107.
The data points to a steady decrease, then an almost two fold increase in
time followed by a steady decrease again. We believe this is because, on
average, one less base prime may be used in signature sieving. Using one
less base prime results in approximately twice as much work.
• In the computation for ψ12, our actual crossover point X was 30 · 107, even
though the timing data would suggest the optimal crossover point is around
12 · 107. From a cost-efficiency point of view, we chose poorly. However,
the choice was made with two considerations. One is that the program
to compute GCDs (Algorithm 1) is simple to write, so that program was
up and running quickly, and we let it run while we wrote the sieving code
(Algorithm 2). Second is that, initially, we did not know which ψm value
we would ultimately be able to compute. Since the results from GCD
computations apply to all larger values of m, we opted to err in favor of
computing more GCDs.
4.5. Signature Sieving. Figure 3 shows the impact that signature sieving makes.
Here the squares in the graph give λ-sieving times with no signature information
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Figure 3. Signature Sieving and λ-Sieving
used, and the diamonds show the same λ-sieving work done while taking advantage
of signature information using the space-saving wheel. Since there is relatively little
variance involved in λ-sieving, each point represents the first prime after n · 107 for
10 ≤ n ≤ 60. On the same interval signature sieving practically looks like it takes
constant time compared to λ-sieving. If we had opted to not incorporate signature
sieving in, then the expected crossover point given these timings would occur when
the primes are around 42 · 107.
References
1. Eric Bach, Explicit bounds for primality testing and related problems, Math. Comp. 55 (1990),
no. 191, 355–380. MR 1023756 (91m:11096)
2. Daniel Bleichenbacher, Efficiency and security of cryptosystems based on number theory,
Ph.D. thesis, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, 1996.
3. Franc¸ois G. Dorais and Dominic Klyve, A Wieferich prime search up to 6.7× 1015, J. Integer
Seq. 14 (2011), no. 9, Article 11.9.2, 14. MR 2859986
4. Brian Dunten, Julie Jones, and Jonathan Sorenson, A space-efficient fast prime number sieve,
Inform. Process. Lett. 59 (1996), no. 2, 79–84. MR 1409956 (97g:11141)
5. G. H. Hardy and E. M. Wright, An introduction to the theory of numbers, 5th ed., Oxford
University Press, 1979.
6. Henryk. Iwaniec, On the Brun-Titchmarsh theorem, J. Math. Soc. Japan 34 (1982), no. 1,
95–123.
7. Gerhard Jaeschke, On strong pseudoprimes to several bases, Math. Comp. 61 (1993), no. 204,
915–926. MR 1192971 (94d:11004)
8. Yupeng Jiang and Yingpu Deng, Strong pseudoprimes to the first eight prime bases, Math.
Comp. (2014), 1–10 (electronic).
9. A. Languasco and A. Zaccagnini, A note on Mertens’ formula for arithmetic progressions,
Journal of Number Theory 127 (2007), no. 1, 37 – 46.
10. Francesco Pappalardi, On the order of finitely generated subgroups of q*(mod p) and divisors
of p1, Journal of Number Theory 57 (1996), no. 2, 207 – 222.
11. Francesco Pappalardi, On the r-rank Artin conjecture, Math. Comp. 66 (1997), no. 218,
853–868. MR 1377664 (97f:11082)
12. Carl Pomerance, J. L. Selfridge, and Samuel S. Wagstaff, Jr., The pseudoprimes to 25 · 109,
Math. Comp. 35 (1980), no. 151, 1003–1026. MR 572872 (82g:10030)
STRONG PSEUDOPRIMES TO TWELVE PRIME BASES 17
13. Michael O. Rabin, Probabilistic algorithm for testing primality, J. Number Theory 12 (1980),
no. 1, 128–138. MR 566880 (81f:10003)
14. A. Scho¨nhage and V. Strassen, Schnelle Multiplikation großer Zahlen, Computing (Arch.
Elektron. Rechnen) 7 (1971), 281–292, MR 45 #1431. MR 45 #1431
15. Jonathan P. Sorenson, The pseudosquares prime sieve, Algorithmic number theory, Lec-
ture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 4076, Springer, Berlin, 2006, pp. 193–207. MR 2282925
(2007m:11168)
16. Jonathan P. Sorenson, Sieving for pseudosquares and pseudocubes in parallel using doubly-
focused enumeration and wheel datastructures, Proceedings of the 9th International Sympo-
sium on Algorithmic Number Theory (ANTS-IX) (Nancy, France) (Guillaume Hanrot, Fran-
cois Morain, and Emmanuel Thome´, eds.), Springer, July 2010, LNCS 6197, ISBN 978-3-642-
14517-9, pp. 331–339.
17. Damien Stehle´ and Paul Zimmermann, A binary recursive GCD algorithm, Sixth International
Algorithmic Number Theory Symposium (Burlington, Vermont, USA) (Duncan Buell, ed.),
Springer, June 2004, LNCS 3076, pp. 411–425. MR MR2138011 (2006e:11194)
18. Zhenxiang Zhang, Two kinds of strong pseudoprimes up to 1036, Math. Comp. 76 (2007),
no. 260, 2095–2107 (electronic). MR 2336285 (2008h:11114)
Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering, Butler University
E-mail address: sorenson@butler.edu
Department of Mathematics and Actuarial Science, Butler University
E-mail address: jewebste@butler.edu
